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Abstract
This paper shows that if a very small, exogenously given probability of terminating the exchange is
introduced in an elementary investment game, more reciprocators will choose the defection strategy.
Everything happens as if they "hide behind probabilities" in order to break the trust relationship. Investors
do not alter their behavior in a significant way, at least not for a very small external risk. Financial assets
all come with a predetermined and contractual probability that by the time when the buyer has to receive
the reward for his investment, "bad luck" might have brought the asset value down to zero. In the light
of the experimental findings, such trades would not provide a favorable environment for building trust.
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1 Introduction
From Aristote to present times, philosophers and political thinkers keep on claiming that there
is something rotten in the realm of financial trades. Robert Solomon, a highly respected moral
philosopher, pointed out that there is huge diﬀerence between the quest for profit of the traditional
producer of goods, and the "abstract greed" of financial intermediaries (Solomon,1992). In the
aftermath of the Great Recession of 2007-2009, many journalists, political leaders and even a few
economists argued that the main culprit for this dramatic outcome was the "unleashed greed"
of main players in the financial market. For instance, Laurence Summers, in his role of the US
President economic advisor, argues that during the crisis "an abundance of greed and an absence
of fear led some to make investments not based on the real value of assets, but on the faith that
there would be another who would pay more for those assets" (Summers, 2009). Joseph Stiglitz
(2010, p. 19) also notices that "Wall Streets’ high rewards and single-minded focus on making
money might attract more than its fair share of the ethically challenged, but the universality of the
problem suggests that there are fundamental flows in the system". If such criticism is nowadays
shared by a majority of people, there are not many convincing explanations of why trades in
financial assets should be more prone to this kind of egoistic behavior than trades in any other
goods.
In this paper we bring empirical evidence in favor of the assumption according to which, by
contrast with many other markets, financial transactions do not provide a favorable environment
for building trust. As pointed out by many scholars, trust is one important lubricant of a social
system where resource allocation is based on voluntary exchange (e.g., Arrow, 1974; McKean,
1975; Noreen, 1988). Dasgupta (2000, p.50) emphasizes that: "Trust is of much importance
precisely because its presence or absence can have a strong bearing on what we choose to do and
in many cases what we can do. The clause concerning the inability to monitor others’ actions in
my definition of trust is crucial. If I can monitor what others have done before I choose my own
action, the word ‘trust’ loses its potency". When, for one reason or another, the trust relationship
is broken, transaction costs increase dramatically and markets might not perform in a smooth way
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their role of allocating resources.
There is no reason to believe that all markets (a) require and (b) generate the same amount of
trust. On many markets the buyer knows what he is buying at the moment when he pays for the
goods, thus trust is of little utility. In markets for "experience goods" (Nelson, 1970), the buyer
will learn the quality of the product only after using it. Some transactions, such as the booming
e-commerce, are sequential by nature: first the buyer pays the price, then he will get the product;
there is always a risk that the quality of the good may fall below the product specifications. In
these markets trust appears as a convenient way to economize on various transaction costs related
to seller’s would-be misbehavior (Gefen, 2000; McKnight et al., 2002).
Trust is much needed on financial markets. Indeed, the buyer of a financial asset owes a
promise to get more resources in the future and, as is the case for all promises, there is an
element of uncertainty about the ability of the seller to keep his word. In particular, both seller’s
misbehavior and exogenous (natural) events can bring the future value of the asset down to zero. It
is important to notice that, compared to other markets, a predetermined probability that the asset
might worth nothing is contractual in financial trades: by construction, the value of a financial
asset at a future time depends on the state of the nature, a random event. The price the buyer pays
for the asset is the mathematical expectation of the discounted utility connected to all possible
outcomes, including the outcome that the asset will worth zero.
We argue that the trust relationship between participants to exchange is deeply undermined
when such "external randomness" is part of the transaction. In particular, we posit that those
playing the role of the asset seller (or trustee) will be more tempted to break the trust relationship if
they can "hide behind probabilities", i.e., invoke "bad luck" when they have actually implemented
their selfish defection strategy. They might do so because, ex-post, those acting in the buyer’s role
(or trustor) can no longer distinguish whether the adverse eﬀects are due to the trustee’s decision
to break the trust relationship or to the external event. In general the trust relationship builds on
a mutual assessment of what "good behavior" is. We expect trustees to care about the opinion
of the trustors, even if they do not know each other. Since there is no enforcement mechanism at
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work, this tie is fragile. If a good pretext1 oﬀers to them, some trustees would compromise with
moral norms and behave in the most selfish way.2
In order to test for this theory, this paper develops an original variant of the traditional
investment game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995). The latter has extensively been used to
study the trust relationship. In the standard setup, an investor (player A) decides whether to
transfer or not an amount of money to a reciprocator (player B). Before reaching the reciprocator,
the transferred amount is augmented by the experiment administrator. Then the reciprocator
decides whether or not to return some of the sum to the investor. Analyzing the problem as a
one-shot, non-cooperative, sequential game, the dominant strategy for the reciprocator is to take
all the money, thus the dominant strategy for the investor is not to transfer (this is the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium). However, in standard experiments, all the three possible outcomes
are systematically observed: the one where the investor sends no money to the reciprocator, the
partial trust outcome where the investor sends money and the reciprocator does not return a dime,
and the mutual trust outcome where the investor sends money to the reciprocator and the later
returns sometimes less, sometimes more than the amount initially invested. The mutual trust
situation maps well the equilibrium of the cooperative game, wherein both players are better-oﬀ
as compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium.
In the framework of the investment game, trust can therefore be interpreted as a (moral)
value-driven way of building ties between participants to an exchange. Trust sets a natural limit
on ineﬃcient selfishness and brings about the Pareto-dominant cooperative outcome. People who
reciprocate (at a cost for themselves) might do so because they want to reward a risky move of the
person who placed his trust in them. Why investors send money in the first place is still a question
open to debate. In general it is assumed that investors bet on the willingness of the trustees to
reciprocate, and implement a strategy that maximize their expected return; their decision might
also be driven by altruism, charity, or fairness considerations (see Camerer, 2003). In Western
1 Pretext : a purpose or motive alleged or an appearance assumed in order to cloak the real intention or state
of aﬀairs (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2010).
2 Depending on the motive to invest, some trustors might also take advantage of this wiggle room and chose the
no-trust strategy.
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societies, trust in others is, in general, considered as a virtue; an investor who chooses the trust
strategy might thus infer some utility only from being perceived by the others as a trustful person.
We slightly modify the original set-up by introducing an element of randomness that dis-
connects the outcome observed by the investor from the action of the reciprocator. Like in the
standard set-up, the investor decides whether or not to send a (fixed) amount to the reciproca-
tor.3 If he transfers the money, a third party called Nature can decide whether to terminate the
exchange and (the invested amount is then lost) or to continue it. Nature’s move is random, the
probability to terminate the relationship is common knowledge. If the exchange continues, the
administrator multiplies the invested amount by a predetermined factor (bigger than one) and
gives it to the reciprocator. The latter decide whether to keep all the money, or send back to the
investor a predetermined sum (larger than the amount initially sent).
Thus, the only diﬀerence between this game and the traditional one consists in introducing
an external risk of terminating the relationship between the investor and the reciprocator. Given
that we want to make sure that changes in players’ behaviors are induced by an alteration of the
trust relationship and not by a reevaluation of the expected payoﬀ of the investor, the external
probability of termination must be very small.4 In the presence of this objective risk, when
the investor sees no money forthcoming, he cannot say without ambiguity whether this is due to
"bad luck" or to the reciprocator’s "greed". Since the investor’s assessment of the reciprocator’s
behavior is "blurred", the latter’s feelings of shame or guilt might fade away.
Our experimental results corroborate this main assumption. The frequency of reciprocators
who play the selfish strategy increases dramatically once that we introduce the objective risk. To
the contrary, for a small risk, investors do not seem to anticipate the change in reciprocators’
behavior; the frequency of investors who play the trust strategy does not decline in a significant
way. This asymmetric response is removed for a larger objective risk.
Consequences at the macro level are straightforward: markets characterized by substantial
external randomness - such as the financial market - would provide a more favorable environment
3 A fixed amount variant allows to focus on the external risk as the single control.
4 The reciprocator plays after the Nature’s move, so his payoﬀ is certain.
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for the proliferation of extremely selfish behavior, as compared to markets where sellers cannot
"hide behind the probabilities" in order to deceive buyers.
These results are much in line with the transaction costs literature that shows that increasing
anonymity increases the probability of opportunity and deceitful behavior (Williamson, 1975;
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). While this literature emphasizes the role of reputation - agents
extract information from observed behavior to update their beliefs about their trading partner,
and cannot do so if transactions are anonymous - our paper focuses on the role of trust, that diﬀuse
but fundamental moral tie between humans, that exists irrespective of monitoring and experience.
The paper is organized as following. The next section introduces the analytical context and
the experimental design. Section 3 presents the main results. The conclusion and some policy
implication are presented in the last section.
2 Context and design of the experience
2.1 Related work
There is a huge literature on trust in experimental games, such as surveyed for instance by Harvey
(2002) and Tazdaït (2008).5 Some of these papers have also analyzed the interaction between
trust and external risk factors. For instance, Houser, Schunk and Winter (2010) study how the
personal interaction in an investment game is modified when the reaction of the reciprocator is
subject to induced randomness. Firstly they measure the risk aversion of the players. Then, they
made subjects play four times a trust game, where the investor is a human, while the reciprocator
is either a human without known history of moves, or a human with move history, or a random
computer, or a computer replicating human history of moves. Results put forward that risk
attitude is an important explanatory variable in games against the computer (objective risk),
but not in the trust game (between humans). Camerer and Weigelt (1988) analyze the trust
behavior in a finite horizon repeated game, with uncertainty about the "type" of the trustee,
who can be more or less trustworthy. Investors upgrade their beliefs by observing the moves of
trustees. When playing the game several times, players tend to discover the sequential equilibrium,
5 See also Johnson and Mislin (2010) for a meta-ananlysis of 143 replications of the trust game.
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although some biases subside (people tend to cooperate more often than expected). Casari and
Cason (2009) compare the outcome of a trust game played in the "strategy method" where the
reciprocator must decide whether he will send back money to the investor before the latter makes
his choice, with the classical setup where the reciprocator moves after he learns the investor’s
choice (the "game method"). They show that the amount send back is larger in the game method
as compared to the strategy method.
A significant change in interpersonal interactions induced by external randomness has already
been observed by Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007) in the framework of the dictator game. Under
the "known" rule, the dictator can choose between the bundle (6 for him, 1 for the receiver) or the
bundle (5 for him, 5 for the receiver). Subjects play the game several times and reach the standard
outcome: many people are "generous", i.e., they prefer (5, 5) to (6,1). Under the "unrevealed"
rule, bundles can be either (6,1) and (5,5) or, a new combination, (6,5) and (5,1). At the outset
of the game, the dictator sees only his own gain from choosing a bundle (6 or 5); he does not see
the gain of the receiver. In order to find out the latter, he must push on a button. What the
experiments have shown is that in general players do not press the button, and choose more often
the bundle that provides them the largest payoﬀ. Not only they "hide behind risk" in order to
get the largest payoﬀ, but they do not want to have this risk removed.
Several scholars have analyzed the contract game between a principal and an agent where
the outcome depends on both the agent’s eﬀort and Nature’s random draw. In presence of such
objective uncertainty, if a project fails due to low eﬀort, the agent can claim that he exerted
the high eﬀort, but he had bad luck. Keser and Willinger (2000; 2007) defined this situation
as a "hidden action". They show that the standard theoretical hypothesis according to which
the agent would accept the contract provided that his expected utility is slightly above zero does
not hold in an experimental setting; indeed, in this context, agents require a "fair share" of the
surplus in order to participate. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) analyze a similar contracting
game. One main result from their experiment is that pre-contractual communication limits the
agent’s recourse to "hidden actions". They argue that human sentiments such as shame and guilty
could play an important role in containing opportunistic behavior.
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Other scholars have investigated the specificity of the trust relationship in financial markets.
In a paper that combines experiments and observation of actual behavior, Karlan (2005) shows
that persons identified as "trustworthy" in experimental games are less likely to default on loans
in real life. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of
trust as pertaining to the decision to buy shares. They notice that: "in determining whether to
invest in a stock an individual has to assess not only what is the "true" distribution of returns,
but also what is the possibility that the company is just a scam, that the manager steals all
the proceeds, or that the broker absconds with the money instead of investing it" (Guido et al.,
2008: p. 2563). Trust is then modelled as the subjective probability that investors assign to
emergence of these "extreme bad events" that drive to zero the firm value, captured by the catch-
all situation "the firm cheats". Using Dutch and Italian micro data, they put forward that less
trusting individuals are less likely to buy stock, and if they buy, they buy less. At diﬀerence with
these papers that analyze the impact of trust on financial transactions (volume, diversification,
investment strategies), our paper focuses on the reverse causality: how (financial) risk influences
the quality of the trust relationship.
2.2 Structure of the game
The experience was cast as a one-shot sequential game between an investor (player A) and a
reciprocator (player B). The two players do not know each other; the rule of the game and
structure of payoﬀs is common knowledge. The experiment builds on the "game method", i.e. the
reciprocator is called to make his choice after investor’s move. The original contribution of the
paper as compared to a standard investment game is the introduction of Nature, a virtual player
(the computer) that can terminate the exchange between the investor and the reciprocator with
a known probability p.
The sequence of decisions is the following:
• At the outset of the experience, player A gets 2 euros. He can decide to keep them or to
transfer 1 euro to B. If he keeps them, the game is over.
• If he transfers the one euro, an external agent, called Nature, decides with a probability
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p ≥ 0 whether to terminate the exchange between player A and player B, or to continue it.
Both players know this probability. If the interaction is terminated, the investor losses his
investment and the reciprocator gets nothing. Nature’s action is hidden: nor the investor,
neither the reciprocator know what Nature did: they only see the payoﬀ at the end of the
game.
• If the interaction is continued, the administrator multiplies the one euro amount by five and
gives them to B.
• Player B has the choice between the defection strategy where he takes the whole amount,
or the refund strategy, where he can keep 3 euros for himself and return two euros to player
A. The game ends.
Figure 1 presents the decision tree.
p
(1-p)
Player A
‘investor’
Nature Player B
‘trustee’
Exchange continues
Exchange terminates
Takes the money
Pays back 2 euros
(Gain A, Gain B)
(3, 3)
(1, 0)
(1, 5)
(2, 0)
Keeps the money
Sends 1 euro
Administrator
Multiplies 
the amount by 5
Gets 2 euros
Figure 1: Decision Tree
The upper dotted curve indicates that an investor (Player A) who at the end of the game sees
that his payoﬀ is 1 euros, cannot infer from this information whether the reciprocator has played
8
the defection strategy or Nature has terminated the relationship. This "blurred information"
might attenuate reciprocators’ feelings of shame or guilt for not rewarding a person who put their
trust in them.
The lower dotted curve indicates that the reciprocator (Player B) who gets nothing will not
be able to infer whether this implies that the investor did not play the trust strategy or whether
Nature has terminated the exchange.
2.3 Optimal and actual strategies; behavioral implications
• The reciprocator (player B)
For p = 0, the former game is identical to the elementary investment game (Berg et al. 1995).
Under the elementary definition of rationality, the dominant strategy for the reciprocator is to
take the money and leave. The traditional result in experimental economics according to which a
majority of subjects choose the return strategy has been interpreted as trustworthiness.
Since the reciprocator plays after Nature, his attitude towards risk should not bear on his
preferred strategy. Thus any observed change in the reciprocator’s behavior when a positive
probability of terminating the exchange is introduced can be directly related to the way how the
investor interprets defection. When moving from p = 0 to p > 0, the investor who sees no money
forthcoming can no longer identify the reason of this outcome: either the reciprocator has betrayed
him, or bad luck occurred. The reciprocator might take advantage of this "wiggle room" in order
to implement the defection strategy.6
We can thus introduce a more specific hypothesis to be tested:
H.1. The frequency of reciprocators playing the selfish strategy must be higher for p > 0 than
for p = 0, even if p is very small.
• The investor (player A)
Taking the same elementary definition of rationality, since the optimal strategy of the recip-
rocator is defection, the optimal rational strategy of the first player is not to invest. Yet in
6 This possibility has been documented by Dana et al. (2007) in the framework of a dictator game. Charness
and Dufwenberg (2006) argued that the presence of an objective risk (no matter how small) provides the agent in
a pricipal-agent contract game with a good pretext to pursue a hidden action, probably because his sentiments of
shame or guilt are watered down to some extent.
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experimental settings a majority of investors send the money, which has been interpreted as trust
in the other. Following Gambetta (2000) and Guiso et al. (2008), we can define trust as the
positive subjective probability µ assigned by an investor to the event that player will return the
investment and a reward (in our game, the reward of investing 1 euro is 2 euros). Furthermore,
since people diﬀer in their ability to trust the others, investors’ own µ should follow a statistical
distribution of p.d.f. f() and c.d.f. F (); the support of these distributions is [0, 1]. It is reasonable
to assume that f() is single-peaked. The shape of the distribution itself depends on the settings
of the problem, and mainly on p.
Since the investor must decide whether to transfer the money before the realization of the
objective risk, a large objective probability of Nature terminating the exchange (p) might prompt
him to play the no-trust strategy merely because for a given µ, the expected gain declines. Thus,
before moving to our empirical analysis, we must analyze the relationship between the objective
probability and the trust decision.
For so doing, we assume that the investor will chose the strategy that brings him the largest
(expected) monetary payoﬀ. Adding a constant monetary payoﬀ to acknowledge that the act of
giving directly increases the satisfaction of the sender, for altruistic, charity or fairness motives,
would not modify the basic reasoning. Changes in the frequency of investors that follow the no-
trust strategy depend in a significant way on whether changes in p prompt investors to revise their
beliefs about the reciprocator’s behavior.
To keep this theoretical analysis simple, we follow Holt and Laury (2002) and assume that for
small payoﬀs players are risk neutral. The expected gain of the investor who plays his "trust"
strategy (i.e., invest the 1 euro) is:
E[gA|trust] = (1− p)[(1− µ)× 1 + µ× 3] + p× 1 = 1 + 2µ(1− p). (1)
Player A prefers to transfer the euro to player B if the expected gain from the trust strategy is
larger than the payoﬀ from the no-trust strategy.
E[gA|trust] > [gA|selfish]⇔ 1 + 2µ(1− p) > 2⇔ 2µ(1− p) > 1. (2)
Condition (2) allows to determine, for a given p, which is the critical probability µˆ(p) below which
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no investor will engage in the trust strategy:
µˆ(p) =
1
2(1− p) , (3)
with dµˆdp =
1
2(1−p)2 > 0. For p = 0, we have µˆ(0) = 0.5 In this context, investors that play the trust
strategy in the elementary game (p = 0) are characterized by µ > 0.5. Notice that for p = 0.5,
we have µ = 1 : in this game, if the external risk p is bigger than 0.5, nobody will play the trust
strategy.
For a given p, the frequency of investors that follow the no-trust strategy is Pr[µ < µˆ(p)|p] =
F (µˆ(p); p). If investors can internalize the possible change in reciprocators’ behavior if p moves
from 0 to a positive value, then more investors will become mistrustful. Formally, the distribution
F (µ; p > 0) dominates the distribution F (µ; p = 0), that is F (µ; p > 0) > F (µ; p = 0) ∀µ ∈ [0, 1].
Let us denote the partial derivatives Fµ(µ, p) =
∂F (µ,p)
∂µ = f(µ, p) > 0 and Fp() =
∂F ()
∂p ≥ 0. Thus
the total variation in the frequency F is:
dF (µ, p) =
∙
f(µ, p)
2(1− p)2 + Fp(µ, p)
¸
dp. (4)
As already mentioned, the main issue under scrutiny is a change in p from zero to a small positive
value. For an initial p = 0, we can write:
[dF (µ, p)]p=0 = [0.5f(0.5; 0) + Fp(0.5, 0)] dp. (5)
If investors no not revise their beliefs about the reciprocator’s behavior when p changes, the
partial derivative Fp(0.5, 0) = 0, then Eq. (5) becomes [dF (µ, p)]p=0 = [0.5f(0.5; 0)] dp. With
f(0.5; 0) < 1, it turns out that [dF (µ, p)]p=0 < 0.5dp. If changes in p do not prompt investors
to revise their beliefs about the reciprocator’s behavior, then small variations dp > 0 in the
neiborghood of p = 0 should entail even smaller changes in the frequency of investors that follow
the selfish strategy. For instance, if p is raised from 0 to 1%, it turns out that [dF (µˆ)]p=0 < 0.005;
for dp = 0.1, we have [dF (µˆ)]p=0 < 0.05.
We can introduce another testable assumption:
H.2. If moving from p = 0 to a small positive p does not induce a substantial change in
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investors’ behavior, this implies that the latter do not anticipate subsequent changes in the recip-
rocator’s behavior.
If changes in p prompt investors to revise their beliefs about the reciprocator’s behavior, small
variations dp > 0 in the neiborghood of p = 0 can entail large changes in the frequency of investors
that follow the selfish strategy. Indeed, if Fp(0.5, 0) = α, with α > 0, then [dF (µ, p)]p=0 > αdp.
The testable assumption is thus:
H.3. If moving from p = 0 to small positive p induces a substantial change in investors’
behavior, this implies that the latter anticipates subsequent changes in the reciprocator’s behavior.
In this elementary analysis we have assumed that the investor chooses the strategy that brings
him the largest (expected) monetary payoﬀ, given his beliefs about the reciprocator’s response.
Adding an exogenous gain to account for utility derived from altruism would not change this
outcome. Yet those playing the investor’s role could also derive some utility from being perceived
as trustful by the others. Should this factor play a role too, one would expect more investors to
play the no-trust strategy when moving from p = 0 to p > 0 because some investors could take
advantage of the now blurred relationship (the reciprocator who sees no money forthcoming no
longer knows whether the investor did not send the money or bad luck occurred).
2.4 Experimental design
The experiment included a total of 90 students from two French Business Schools (ESC Dijon and
ESSEC) and were conducted in the Experimental Laboratories of the two institutions in April
and May 2010. All the subjects were recruited from the student population of the schools, who
answered to a call for paid decision experiments. The experimental design was presented via
computer interface and all interactions were computerized. The programme was written in z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). Instructions were common knowledge. Experiments last for less than 30
minutes.
Half of the students played the role of the investor, called player A in the experiment, half or
the students played the role of the reciprocator, called player B. Participants were randomly and
anonymously paired as strangers. Each student was asked to play the game three times, for p = 0,
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p = 0.01 and p = 0.10; the order of the three treatments was random, and pairs were recreated at
each round. Nature’s random move (continue/terminate relationship) was computerized, and the
draw respected the displayed probability. Payoﬀs are exactly those indicated in the Decision Tree
(Figure 1) and were paid in cash at the end of the experiment.
Table 1 indicates the location, time, number of subjects and nubmer of pairs for each session.
In sessions 1 to 3 students had a fixed role (either Player A or Player B); in session 4 we allowed
them to play both roles.7
Place Time Number of subjects Number of pairs
Session 1: Dijon March, 18, 2010 22 11
Session 2: Cergy April, 13, 2010 22 11
Session 3: Cergy April, 14, 2010 24 12
Session 4: Cergy May, 5, 2010 22 22*
Table 1. The organization of the experience
Rough data, main screen copies and the English translation of the instructions can be down-
loaded from the web address: https://sites.google.com/a/essec.edu/essec-experimental-la/results/trust-
and-financial-trades.
3 Results and discussion
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the main results. The first table presents investors’ decisions, the second
table presents reciprocators’ choices, for each of the three treatements: no external risk ( p = 0),
small external risk (p = 0.01) and a larger external risk (p = 0.10).
Treatment Number of pairs Number of transfers to B Percentage of transfers
p = 0 56 34 61%
p = 0.01 56 31 55%
p = 0.10 56 25 45%
Table 2. Strategies played by investors (players A)
7 Two pre-test sessions were performed on March, 5 2010 in Dijon with 30 students. Three variants of the game
were tested: this unframed fixed payment variant, an unframed, variable payment variant (amounts transferred
were allowed to vary) and a framed variant, where player B was represented as a company needing an investment.
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Treatment Nature
Number of
possible paybacks
Number of
actual paybacks
Percentage of paybacks
p = 0 0 34 18 53%
p = 0.01 0 31 10 32%
p = 0.10 6 19 8 42%
Table 3. Strategies played by reciprocators (players B)
In addition, Figures 2 and 3 show the frequencies with which the two players have followed
their trust strategies (transfer money for the investor, and pay back for the reciprocator). It
should be emphasized that these frequencies apply to groups of diﬀerent sizes.
61
5355
32
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Investor Reciprocator
p=0
p=0,01
Figure 2: Investors playing the trust strategy; reciprocators playing the refund strategy, for p = 0
and p = 0.01, in percent of total possible moves.
• Results of the standard experiment: p = 0
R0. These results are quite standard. Of the 56 pairs, players A sent money to players B for
34 times (i.e., 61% of the players adopted the trust strategy). Reciprocators paid back 18 times
(53%) and defected 16 times (47%).
• Results of the test with a small probability of termination: p = 0.01.
R1. When such a small objective default probability was introduced, 31 reciprocators got the
5 euros (an insignificant drop with respect to the former situation); only 10 of them chose to pay
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Figure 3: Investors playing the trust strategy; reciprocators playing the refund strategy, for p = 0
and p = 0.10, in percent of total possible moves.
back (instead of 18 refunds in the p = 0 treatment); the frequency of reciprocators’ defection
raised thus from 47% to 68% (21/31). The change in the reciprocator’s strategy is substantial
(incremental rise in the defection rate: 21 percentage points). (While economically significant,
the diﬀerence between the two situations is not statistically significant according to a test as
demanding as the McNemar Chi-squared test: p-value=0.18).
R2. However, despite the change in the reciprocator behavior, the investor did not alter
in a substantial way their behavior, as if they were not been able to anticipate the change in
reciprocators’ behavior. Indeed, the number of transfers from player A to player B weekly declined,
from 34 in the p = 0 treatment to 31 transfers in the p = 0.01 treatment. There is no statistical
diﬀerence in investors’ behavior: the McNemar Chi-squared test p-value=0.66.
• Results of the test with a large probability of termination: p = 0.10.
It is important to notice that for p = 0.10, not only did investors play less often the "no trust
strategy" (only 25 investors out of 56 continue to transfer), but also in our experiment Nature
terminated the relationship in 6 cases. Thus the number of actual transfers to the reciprocator is
much smaller in the p = 0.10 treatment than in both the p = 0 and the p = 0.01 treatments.
R3. In this treatment too, 58% of the reciprocators who get the funds played the defection
strategy (i.e. 11/19), a higher frequency than in the p = 0 treatment where the defection strategy
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was played by 47% of the reciprocators (incremental rise in the defection rate: 11 percentage
points).
R4. A substantially lower number of investors played the trust strategy (send money), from
61% (34/56) in the p = 0 treatment to 45% (25/56) in the p = 0.10% treatment, i.e. a reduction
by 16 percentage points. The McNemar Chi-squared test for a substantial diﬀerence is significant
at 6%.
• The Synthesis
a) R1 and R3 corroborate H1: When an objective risk is introduced in a standard investment
game, reciprocators hide behind probabilities and more of them implement the deception strategy.
as already mentioned, this surge in opportunistic behavior in presence of external randomness has
already been revealed by Dana et al. (2000) in a diﬀerent experimental set-up (dictator game).
b) The rise in the reciprocators’ defection rates is higher in the very small probability treatment
(p = 0.01) than in the larger probability treatment (p = 0.10). While a straightforward explanation
is not easy to fit, this idiosyncratic behavior might be explained if, in the higher risk situation,
reciprocators do express some form of gratitude toward investors that have taken more risk to
send them money (the reciprocation eﬀect is stronger).
c) R2 corroborates H2. For a small external probability, despite a strong adjustment in recip-
rocators’ behavior, investors do not alter in a significant way their strategies, as if they do not
anticipate reciprocators’ change in behavior. In Casari and Casson (2009) experiment with the
trust game, investors also appeared limited in their ability to internalize changes in reciprocators’
behavior.
d) According to R3, investors would correct their "error" for a larger probability of termi-
nating the relationship. Risk aversion would induce a similar response; yet, for small gains it is
highly probable that players are risk neutral. That investors who care about being perceived as
trustful do also "hide behind probabilities" and chose the no-trust strategy, might provide another
explanation.
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4 Conclusion
This paper provides new evidence on the eﬀect of external randomness on the trust relationship
between two parties to a trade. In particular, we have shown that if a very small and exoge-
nously given probability of terminating the exchange (1% to be more specific) is introduced in
a elementary investment game, the frequency of reciprocators who choose the defection strategy
raises from 47% to 68%. Reciprocators seem to hide behind the external risk in order to carry
out their most selfish strategy. In the experiment, investors do not seem able to fully internalize
this change in behavior, at least not for this very small external risk. The fact that subjects were
young students, with a natural tendency to trust their colleagues, might have induced a bias. It
would be interesting to run the experiment with more experienced players.
For sure, situations captured by such a simple experimental framework cannot claim to pro-
vide a comprehensive explanation for the extremely individualistic behavior observed in financial
markets. In particular, financial transactions are both impersonal and not necessarily repeated.
Then, as transaction costs theory points out, incentives for the players to build reputation are
weak. Yet this argument does not explain why, during the last crisis, many banks that had sold
an image of champions of long-term firm-customer relationships, have betrayed their clients and
took on their books excessively high amounts of risk (Diamond and Rajan, 2009; Besancenot and
Vranceanu, 2011).8
Our alternative explanation for this selfish attitude emphasizes the relationship between risk
and trust. Indeed, an objective probability of default is a built-in feature of all financial transac-
tions. Thus, when the value of an asset collapses, no one can tell whether this happened because
the asset was poorly managed or because of mere bad luck. According to results of our experi-
ment, the trust relationship is deeply undermined because the seller of the asset can "hide behind
probabilities". He will resort more often to the selfish non-cooperative strategy as compared to
sellers’ behavior in markets where the objective risk of non-delivery is not contractual. With some
8 The Goldman Sachs scandal produced by the bank’s participation in packaging and selling a pool of dubious
mortgage loans on request by a hedge fund manager who bet against this pool of loans is illustrative for these
ethical dilemmas. For years Goldman has claimed to be concerned with the long-term interest of its clients and
partners (see "Greedy until proven guilty", The Economist, April 24th, 2010).
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caution, such systematic recourse to the defection strategy might be interpreted as "greed".
After the 2007-2009 crisis, many observers blamed the opacity of banks and complex financial
assets for having provided a favorable playing ground for the most opportunistic and ruthless
traders. Transaction cost literature has pointed out long time ago that increasing transaction
anonymity increases the probability of selfish and deceitful behavior. Hence, increasing trans-
parency of financial institutions has become probably the most consensual policy recommendation
(Acharya et al. 2009; Stiglitz, 2010). Our paper does not run against this recommendation, yet it
calls for cautious optimism: since even a small external risk of value destruction suﬃces to harm
the trust relationship, increasing transparency might have only second order eﬀects. Only by fully
removing the external risk that one could create a trust friendly environment, but this task is
diﬃcult, since risk is an intrinsic component of all financial trades.
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